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John S. Earle
Postcommunist Privatization  
and Productivity 
What Have We Learned?
and Wilhelmsson 2006) suggests that 
Swedish government policy encouraging 
more decentralized research activity at 
newer universities may have increased 
Sweden’s productivity.
Improving Local Standards of  
Wage Fairness 
The labor market practices of higher 
education and health care institutions, 
or other large local employers, may 
influence beliefs in local labor markets 
about the fairness of employer practices. 
If a few large employers in a local 
economy choose “high road” labor 
market practices, with higher wages, more 
internal promotion, and lower employee 
turnover, other local employers may 
emulate them.. 
However, we find that higher education 
industries pay over 14 percent less than 
the average industry, controlling for many 
worker characteristics. On the other hand, 
medical service industries pay about 5 
percent more than the average industry. 
These wage findings are not just due to 
average pay for professors and doctors, 
but also reflect wages for workers with 
Bachelor’s or Associate’s degrees.
The Bottom Line
We have sufficient research evidence 
to conclude that efforts to expand 
higher education or medical service 
industries should not be ignored by 
regional economists or local economic 
developers. We estimate that, on average, 
an economic development policy that 
would expand the higher education 
service sector by 1 percent of total local 
employment would increase average 
local earnings by 0.2 percent, compared 
to 0.1 percent for a similar-sized 
expansion in the medical services sector. 
Although such earnings effects may 
sound small, for the typical metropolitan 
area these amount to many millions 
of dollars. If the costs of inducing an 
expansion in higher education or medical 
services is sufficiently low, an economic 
development strategy that targets these 
industrial sectors may offer net benefits.
Note
1. In this article and in the research upon 
which it is based, “eds and meds” is defined as 
organizations and firms that provide educational 
and medical services to consumers (e.g., students, 
patients), such as universities, community colleges, 
The design of privatization 
policies and their consequences for 
firm performance have been among 
the most controversial issues in 
postcommunist Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union. From the early 
1990s, policymakers and observers saw 
privatization as the linchpin of a strategy 
to improve managerial incentives, 
encourage firm restructuring, and 
generally bring about a shift to a “private 
property regime.” In many countries, 
the initial enthusiasm for ownership 
change led to large-scale divestment 
through “mass privatization,” as well 
as giveaways to employees and rapid 
sales to domestic and foreign investors. 
The emphasis on privatization became 
decidedly less fashionable later in the 
1990s, as critics argued that the programs 
had either done little good but resulted 
in misplaced priorities (for instance, by 
neglecting institutional change) or had 
actually caused damage (for instance, by 
facilitating asset stripping).
Yet the evidence supporting either 
of these positions was until very 
recently quite weak. At the beginning of 
transition, there was little or no relevant 
previous experience to justify the strong 
pro-privatization enthusiasm. And by the 
hospitals, and doctors’ offices. Pharmaceutical 
companies, biotech research, textbook companies, 
or other suppliers of inputs to these educational or 
medical service providers are not included in our 
definition of “eds and meds.”
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late 1990s few systematic studies existed 
to support the negative views of the 
critics, who instead relied almost entirely 
on either macroeconomic performance 
indicators (which tended to be quite poor 
through the mid-1990s in most countries) 
or on anecdotes. Just as the critics’ 
position, which was part of a broader 
attack on the “Washington consensus,” 
seemed to become dominant, a surge 
of statistical studies of privatized firms 
began to appear, and most of these tend 
to report positive effects of privatization 
on measures of firm performance in many 
countries (see the summary in Djankov 
and Murrell [2002]). But the studies 
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suffer from enough methodological 
weaknesses to make them ineffective in 
persuading most skeptics.
Recent research carried out under the 
auspices of the Upjohn Institute provides 
a firmer empirical basis for drawing 
conclusions about the effectiveness of 
privatization in raising productivity 
(Brown, Earle, and Telegdy 2006). The 
analysis overcomes the typical problems 
of previous studies: incomparability 
across countries, small sample sizes, 
short time series, and lack of control for 
selection bias in the privatization process. 
The data used in the analysis consist 
of firm-level information from four 
countries—Hungary, Romania, Russia, 
and Ukraine—that span the varieties 
of privatization policies and reform 
strategies among transition economies. 
The set of information covers nearly all 
manufacturing enterprises inherited from 
the central planning period, and the time 
series for each firm ranges from as early 
as 1985 (in Russia) to 2002 (in all four 
countries). 
The large samples of firms facilitate 
comparisons within industries, and the 
long time series make it possible to take 
into account biases in the selection of 
firms to be privatized. They also allow 
for the possibility that privatization 
might have anticipatory effects, which 
could be either positive (if managerial 
incentives are increased by the expected 
benefits under new owners), or negative 
(if managers see little future with the 
firm and resort to asset stripping). 
Either type of behavior would result in 
a biased estimate of the privatization 
effect in a simple comparison of pre- and 
postprivatization performance. Finally, 
the Upjohn study applies evaluation 
methods developed for labor market 
programs to estimate the productivity 
impact of privatization.
Privatization Policies and Results
The three main methods of 
privatization are transfer to employees, 
mass privatization programs, and case-
by-case sales. Privatization through 
employee-giveaways was common in 
Russia and Ukraine, a bit less common 
in Romania, and little used in Hungary 
(except for some managerial buyouts). 
The method is attractive because of 
its relative ease of administrative 
and political implementation and the 
possibility that employee ownership 
may improve work incentives, company 
loyalty, and support for restructuring; 
widely dispersed ownership among 
employees may also facilitate takeovers 
by outsider investors. On the other 
hand, insider privatization is frequently 
alleged to be ill-suited to the restructuring 
demands of the transition. Employees 
may lack the necessary skills, capital, 
technologies, and access to markets 
necessary to turn their firms around, 
and corporate governance by employees 
may function particularly poorly when 
the firm requires difficult restructuring 
choices involving disparate distributional 
impacts within the firm.
Mass privatization programs, typically 
involving vouchers distributed to citizens, 
have also accounted for a substantial 
share of privatization in many transition 
countries, including Romania, Russia, 
and Ukraine, but again not Hungary. In 
principle, such programs may avoid high 
levels of inside ownership, but in Russia 
and Ukraine they were in fact combined 
with strong preferences for employees 
to use their vouchers in acquiring shares 
in their employers.  A serious problem 
with the programs is the risk of highly 
dispersed ownership structures, a 
problem normally addressed through the 
creation of intermediaries— either by the 
state as part of the program as in Poland 
and Romania—or by private parties 
competing for individuals’ vouchers.
The final major privatization method, 
case-by-case sales of large blocks of 
shares to outside investors, is the method 
used most often in the West and to many 
observers is the most likely to encourage 
productivity-enhancing restructuring. 
Hungary is rare among transition 
economies in relying almost exclusively 
on sales (East Germany and Estonia are 
two other examples). But most countries 
have used this method for some share of 
privatization; in this study, sales are more 
common in Romania and less common in 
Russia and Ukraine. The disadvantages 
of sales are related to insufficient demand 
and political difficulties compounded 
by problems of valuation. In addition, 
sales contracts frequently include not 
only a price, but also commitments 
regarding investment and employment, 
which are taken into account in selecting 
a buyer. Although policymakers may 
feel themselves politically constrained 
to ensure continued employment 
and operation of privatized firms, 
such restrictions could have reduced 
restructuring in the companies privatized 
through block sales, attenuating any 
potential benefits of privatization.
Among the recipients of blocks of 
shares through sales, it may be important 
to distinguish foreign from domestic 
investors. Most observers would 
probably agree that foreign owners are 
likely to have better access to finance, 
management skills, new technologies, 
and knowledge of markets, which would 
suggest a higher productivity effect when 
privatization results in foreign ownership. 
On the other hand, foreigners may face 
special difficulties restructuring firms 
in transition economies, where layoff 
decisions are highly politicized, for 
example, and where local networks and 
knowledge of local conditions may be 
unusually nontransparent. Under such 
conditions, any advantage of foreign 
ownership in raising productivity may 
be reduced, and foreigners might even 
do worse than well-selected domestic 
investors.
The available data provide 
information on whether the new owners 
of a privatized firm are predominantly 
domestic or foreign, but they do not 
otherwise distinguish the methods. 
Nevertheless, the policy differences 
across countries suggest that the 
effectiveness of privatization in raising 
productivity may vary significantly. The 
overall rate of privatization is shown 
in Figure 1, computed on the basis of 
the manufacturing firms originally state 
owned in the database. As of 1992, 
35.4 percent of the Hungarian firms had 
already been privatized, defined here 
as a strict majority of shares held in 
A key result of the study is 
strong evidence that foreign 
privatization has a bigger impact 
than domestic privatization 
in all four countries.
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private hands, while the percentage was 
only 0.2 in Romania and 0.0 in Russia 
and Ukraine. By the end of the period, 
however, most of the firms had been 
privatized in all four countries.
Most privatized firms are controlled 
by domestic investors.  The percentage 
of firms with majority ownership by 
foreigners is by far highest in Hungary, 
reaching 16 percent by 2002.  In 
Romania, the percentage reaches 5 
percent, and in Russian and Ukraine 
close to 1 percent. Although constituting 
a small fraction, the numbers of 
observations are sufficient, given the 
sample sizes, for estimating separate 
coefficients for privatization to foreign 
investors.
Estimating the Productivity Effects  
of Privatization
Estimating the effectiveness of 
privatization in raising productivity 
requires not only excellent data, but also 
careful specification of technology and 
of the selection of privatized firms from 
those initially state owned. The Upjohn 
study in all cases estimates privatization 
effects on multifactor productivity taking 
into account firm-level differences in 
labor and capital, and all estimation is 
carried out within industry-year cells 
to control for changes in prices and 
industry-specific shocks that could be 
correlated with privatization. The study 
also employs a wide range of methods 
to estimate industry-specific production 
functions, including simply assuming 
alternative contributions of capital and 
labor to output. Examination of results 
shows that the estimated privatization 
effects are quite robust, hardly varying 
across different functional forms.
The estimation results are much 
more sensitive, however, with respect 
to the controls for selection into the 
privatization program. Three principal 
approaches are used in the study: 1) 
simply pooling the data and estimating 
standard ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions, 2) including firm-fixed 
effects (FE) to permit each firm to have 
its own idiosyncratic level of productivity 
prior to privatization, and 3) including 
firm-specific time trends as well as fixed 
effects (FE&FT) to permit each firm its 
own idiosyncratic productivity growth. 
The first OLS method implicitly assumes 
that firms are randomly selected to be 
privatized, or at least that the selection 
process is uncorrelated with productivity. 
The FE approach, the second method, 
permits selection to be correlated with 
the level of productivity, and FE&FT, 
the third method, permits selection to be 
correlated also with productivity growth. 
Clearly, FE&FT is quite a demanding 
method, and it has not been used in 
any previous research on the effects of 
privatization.
The estimated effects of privatization 
on productivity using these three methods 
are shown in Figure 2. The vertical axis 
measures the estimated proportionate 
increase in productivity associated with 
a change from majority state to majority 
private ownership. OLS estimates are 
quite large in all four countries, although 
the magnitudes vary significantly across 
them. But the FE estimates vary even 
more, remaining large in Hungary and 
Romania, but becoming small in Ukraine 
and slightly negative in Russia. The 
FE&FT results are further attenuated, 
but they remain significant in Hungary 
and Romania, with magnitudes of 0.08 
and 0.14, respectively. They are negative 
in Russia and small (but positive) in 
Ukraine. The results therefore imply 
robust evidence of large differences in 
Figure 1  Percentage of Sample Firms Privatized, by Year
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the estimated privatization effect across 
the four countries in the study. While the 
effect is clearly larger in the two former 
Soviet “satellites” than in the two former 
Soviet member states, the ranking within 
these groups is rather surprising: the 
evidence implies a somewhat larger effect 
in Romania than Hungary, and in Ukraine 
relative to Russia.
Turning to the effect of privatization to 
foreign investors, Figure 3 shows results 
for the OLS, FE, and FE&FT methods. 
Again, adding firm-fixed effects and firm-
specific trends diminishes the estimated 
effects. By contrast with the overall 
privatization effects of Figure 2, however, 
in all cases the estimates of the foreign 
effects remain large, and in all cases they 
are much larger than the estimates of the 
overall effects. Moreover, the foreign 
effects vary much less across countries 
than the overall effects, suggesting that 
foreign investors tend to have similar 
positive effects on privatized companies 
across a range of types of economies. 
Conclusions
These findings strongly support the 
view that privatization usually raises 
productivity, and they provide some 
support for the view that the method of 
privatization matters. The only relevant 
distinction that can be directly measured 
in the Upjohn study is predominantly 
foreign versus predominantly domestic 
ownership, and a key result of the 
study is strong evidence that foreign 
privatization has a bigger impact 
than domestic privatization in all 
four countries. Further evidence that 
privatization method matters comes from 
cross-country comparisons. The largest 
cross-country differences are between the 
two East European countries (Hungary 
and Romania) versus the two former 
Soviet Republics (Russia and Ukraine), 
which may be attributed to differences in 
the “quality” of privatization, especially 
the extent of concentrated outside 
ownership. In this sense, the results in 
this study put Djankov and Murrell’s 
(2002) hypothesis of such a difference 
between Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union on much firmer ground.
Not all the results are consistent 
with this “regional divide,” nor with 
the interpretation that the method of 
privatization drives its effectiveness in 
raising firm productivity. Most clearly, 
this can be seen from the ordering of 
the magnitude of privatization effects, 
with Romania’s larger than Hungary’s 
and Ukraine’s larger than Russia’s. 
This ranking is inconsistent both with 
superior privatization policies in Hungary 
compared to Romania and Russia 
compared to Ukraine, as well as with 
the ratings of these countries of their 
“progress in transition” by international 
agencies.
A further inconsistency appears 
from a comparison of the overall and 
foreign effects. Foreign privatizations 
are always carried out through sales in 
all four countries, but while domestic 
privatizations are also sales in Hungary, 
they are less likely to be sales in Romania 
and still less likely to be so in Russia 
and Ukraine. Thus, if sales produce 
better productivity effects than other 
methods of privatization, the difference 
between the foreign and overall effects 
should be smallest in Hungary, second 
smallest in Romania, and greatest in 
Russia and Ukraine. But the data show 
large differences between the foreign and 
overall effects in all four countries, and 
the difference is as large for Hungary as 
for Romania.
Finally, the result that the productivity 
effects of foreign privatizations are 
large and of similar magnitude for all 
these countries calls into question the 
view that complementary aspects of the 
macroeconomic or business environment 
alter the effectiveness of privatization, 
unless foreign firms are less sensitive 
to such conditions. The cross-country 
variation in the productivity effects 
of privatization remains an important 
question to address in future research.
John S. Earle is a senior economist at the 
Upjohn Institute. 
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Not all the results are consistent 
with this “regional divide,” 
nor with the interpretation that 
the method of privatization 
drives its effectiveness in 
raising firm productivity.
